The blood would really begin to flow once the shah had left, and the revolutionaries would start to fight over the spoils of a revolution that had left them in charge of one of the most powerful and important states in the Middle East. This mass movement of the Iranian people, which began as something meant to end repression, wound up entrenching it instead. Today it is often forgotten that the revolution was not originally aimed at producing an Islamic theocracy.
What became the Islamic Revolution in Iran was initiated not solely by an Islamist movement but by a coalition of interest groups united against the shah. The Islamists loyal to Khomeini were a part of a wider coalition, which included secular liberals, nationalists, communists and Islamist-Marxists.
Shared antipathy towards the shah was the glue that held these competing ideologies together. That said, signs of how far the pro-Khomeinists were prepared to go to achieve their ideological ambitions could be seen as early as August , when they set fire to Cinema Rex in southwestern city of Abadan to protest against the Westernisation of Iran, killing people. What gave the Islamists the upper hand over the secular opposition was their access to a vast network of mosques and religious institutions across the country.
Unlike the secular groups forced underground by the shah, the organised structures of the clergy enabled Khomeini and his followers to control the revolutionary narrative. It gave him an international platform to foment discord against the shah and established him as a liberator of the Iranian people in the eyes of many Western liberal observers. A combination of insurgency and bloodshed would enable Khomeini to co-opt the revolution.
Some rivals for power would be easier to oust than others. The siege of the US Embassy in Tehran in November would drive the liberals away, but the left, which was instrumental in toppling the shah, would not be so easily deterred. In his brutal treatment of leftist rivals, the ayatollah would show that he was prepared to use violence in service of his mission.
In the fractious infighting that followed the departure of the shah, it is estimated that at least 12, opponents were executed. The creation of the committee resulted in the peremptory mass execution of leftist figures in The ideology works first and foremost as an explanatory tool that provides adherents with a narrative of descent as well as a direction of travel—a utopian vision to be achieved. The more ambitious the vision, the grander the narrative and the greater the justification for excesses that may have been committed or may yet have to be committed.
A world-historical event whose ends are both material and spiritual can justify all sorts of means in the pursuit of those ends. It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that while the Islamic Revolution may have been distinctly Shia in its apparent origins, its ambitions were global, drawing on Islamic history as well as a rich heritage of Iranian universalism one might even describe it as an imperial mentality. These concepts were married to a Marxist inheritance that sought to appeal to the oppressed of the world.
A key intellectual figure in defining revolutionary ideology was Ali Shariati, a Western-educated intellectual. Inspired by the works of Marxist, anti-colonialist scholars like Franz Fanon, Shariati set out to converge Marxism with Islamism.
The aim was a revolutionary ideology that could oust the Pahlavi monarchy and liberate Iranians from the evils of Western imperialism. Like all good revolutionary ideologies, therefore, the ideology of the Islamic revolution could claim to be for the oppressed around the world.
It should come as no surprise that the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, claimed the authorship of the Occupy Wall Street movement in and argued that the Arab Spring that began in was simply the belated echo of the Islamic Revolution in the Arab world.
Perhaps more surprising for observers in the West was the belief among the revolutionaries that their revolution was the third in a line of great revolutions stretching back to the Russian and French Revolutions. Other third-world revolutions were simply not in their field of vision and were largely irrelevant to the grand narrative of revolutionary emancipation that they sought to promote. Another important distinction, which is often missed by more sympathetic observers in the West, is between the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic.
The revolution does not exist to perfect the state; the state—the republic—is simply a means to support and perfect the revolution. Where the two conflict, the revolution is prioritised. This distinction has also been missed by Iranian political actors, anxious as they have been—often with sincerity—to promote the institutions of the republic and the idea of Islamic democracy. These ideas reached their apogee under Mohammad Khatami, Iranian president from to , but have since been systematically dismantled in favour of the purity of the revolution as defined by its most hard-line adherents: a process of spiritual salvation.
According to some, that process is far from fruition and requires a state of permanent revolution and confrontation with the West until the ultimate victory is achieved. It should never be forgotten that the supreme leader is the leader of the revolution, not of the republic, and that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps IRGC is sworn to defend the purity of the revolution from enemies both within and without.
Both these institutions grew in prominence and power under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when this hard-line core ideology finally came into prominent relief. Indeed, the Green Movement protests against the Iranian presidential election results were a rude awakening to many Iranians who had believed the revolution was about political emancipation, when it was abruptly announced that obedience to the supreme leader and his appointees was the equivalent of obedience to God.
No modern Iranian monarch could have made such a claim. These extraordinary ideological positions are largely ignored in the West by those who are determined to see the good in Iranian political life or, in the worst case, fantasise about Iran as the post-colonial or postmodern revolutionary state par excellence, whose consistent opposition to the United States excuses a variety of incongruous behaviour.
What is more, the desire for negotiations to work has muddied the sight and thinking of Western policymakers. In the case of the nuclear negotiations, the well-intentioned but misled European Union EU became the convenor, and the EEAS was forged in the heat of those talks.
The negotiations became part of the foundation myth of the service, and their successful conclusion in July were an act of validation that ensured that the EEAS would protect the agreement at all costs. That induced a tunnel vision, which quite deliberately ignored wider political problems. Paradoxically, therefore, the nuclear agreement, far from binding the hands of the Iranians, bound those of the EU, so determined did the Europeans become not to jeopardise the agreement.
The difference in positions between the West and Iran over the accord became most obvious when the Iranians moved quickly to shore up their Syrian ally after the agreement was signed in July That ran contrary to expectations in the US, where some had anticipated that the nuclear agreement would open the door to further dialogue.
Put simply, while Khamenei might have agreed that the arc of history bent towards justice, the destination he had in mind was not shared by the US. There are many in Iran who seek this goal—but not, alas, the ones who currently hold the reins of power. Just as in some Western observers thought Khomeini would liberate the Iranian people, many today persist in the belief that Iran and its revolution are simply misunderstood, and that the confrontation with the West is simply the result of a misunderstanding.
Although there is a perception that such a view is confined to the far left, its proponents can be found across the political spectrum. Indeed, successive US administrations since , be they Republican or Democrat, have failed to grasp the realities of the revolution and the ideology it seeks to promote, alternating between exaggeration and neglect—and frequently being burned by the experience.
In both cases their approach has generally weakened moderating influences and consolidated those of the revolutionary purists. Iranian hardliners have been all too clear on their mission statement. Only the firmest of convictions in the truth of their mission can explain the sacrifice they are willing to endure and, in many cases, impose on their fellow Iranians.
The first important consequence of the Islamic Revolution was and continues to be geopolitical and regional. Russia, and then the Soviet Union, was admired but feared and had little to offer in terms of political education and scientific progress. For much of the 20th century, therefore, Iran sought to anchor itself to the West.
As it regained strength and prosperity, the country sought to play a more active role in regional security. Iran was a status quo power seeking further integration into the global economy as indicated by the associate status it secured in the late s to the then European Economic Community.
Moreover, even if the shah did not establish formal relations with Israel, there was a strong informal relationship complete with an ambassador in all but name. The revolution overturned this entire structure. While it inherited the Pahlavi state, the revolution did not inherit its worldview: the first foreign leader to visit Tehran was Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation PLO. But it would be a mistake to assert that the revolution was a singular event that transformed the situation.
Better to see it as the start of a process that through experience, reaction and miscalculation reinforced a revolutionary conviction. That conviction remains to this day and, if anything, is more determined in its goals. Regional dynamics are indicative of this process. And while regional governments had dealt with the forces of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism throughout the s and s, the nature of this challenge was greater than anything they had encountered in the past.
After all, Khomeini claimed that his mandate derived from God and the religion of Islam, the greatest source of legitimacy in the Muslim world. This correlation informed their mitigation strategy: embrace Islam more visibly and abandon secular modernisation, which the Islamists claimed to be Westernisation. As the shock of the revolution reverberated throughout the region, among the most affected countries was Saudi Arabia, which found that its former ally had turned to a revolutionary radicalism that was by definition destabilising.
The siege at the Grand Mosque can only have reinforced fears among the Saudi elite about the challenges they now faced. Yet, the left were not the only subjects of repression. Thus, not only had the Shah repressed the political left but he had also pursued the repression of the middle classes.
This left only the religious establishment as a vehicle for revolution. Alongside the widespread repression of this period, the targeted repression of Ali Shariati is also important if we are to understand why non-religious groups failed to lead the revolution.
As noted earlier in this essay, the popular perception of the Iranian revolution is of a religious vanguard led by Ayatolllah Khomeini. The imprisonment and subsequent death of Shariati deprived the Iranian left of a powerful leader and meant that a revolution which followed his ideas failed to materialise. Indeed, we should not ignore the fact that Khomeini successfully led the revolution.
The left, then, were still an active force, but faced a leadership vacuum. Partly, this is due to the widespread repression of secular, leftist movements by the Shah. This is also due to the targeted repression of Shariati, who had been imprisoned frequently since as early as and who was forced into exile until he died Abedi, It is worth noting that Khomeini was also forced into exile but since the mosques and the ulema were not repressed to the extent that the left was, it was simple for Khomeini to return Corboz, Thus, Shariati was a politically active Muslim yet not an Islamist.
However, Shariati was the pre-eminent figure in this tradition as political unrest began in the late s and early s. This section has shown that it is accurate to label the revolution Islamic because Islam can be interpreted in a revolutionary way. The final section of my essay will demonstrate how Islam was not only interpreted as revolutionary but how the integral role of Islam within Iranian society meant that it was the only realistic conduit for revolutionary change.
In terms of organisational structure and power, then, the ulema of Iran played a vital role. The discussion surrounding the role of the ulema in the revolution is vital to answering the question of how Islamic the Iranian revolution was. It will be shown that the demands of the population were not strongly related to Islam, but that Islam allowed these demands to be voiced and thus became the dominant factor in the revolution. Indeed, Moshiri ibid argues that a basic resource-mobilisation approach to revolutions demonstrates that the organisation or group with the most resources will inevitably come to lead the revolution.
Seeberg echoes this view, yet also notes that the lack of military interference allowed the ulema to co-opt the revolution. This relaxation of repression came too late for secular, leftist movements yet allowed the ulema to lead the revolution without any considerable backlash. Both the institutional protection the ulema benefited from and the extensive resources they had explains why the ulema were able to lead the revolution.
Yet, we must also consider why they desired to lead the revolution. In previous crises, such as the coup against democratically-elected Mossadegh, the ulema had sided with authority in this case, the U. A rather than popular opinion Amjad, Therefore, we must consider why the ulema sided with the revolutionaries in It is accurate to suggest that the ulema became the leaders of the revolution because they were relatively untouched by a repressive Shah and had an organisational structure conducive to bringing about widespread change.
However, much as the ulema co-opted the revolution, they also presented the revolution as the fulfilment of Islamic history and belief Roy, The next section will demonstrate how religious occasions and imagery were utilised by the ulema to present the revolution as Islamic. Thus far, this essay has demonstrated that the Iranian revolution was caused by economic and political factors unrelated from the ulema, but that the organisational power of the ulema allowed them to make their revolution their own.
This was also due to the repression of the left and the loss of Ali Shariati who, alongside Ayatollah Khomeini, was a prospective leader of the revolution. Although infrequent protests had been common in Iran throughout the s, revolutionary movements had lacked structure and organisation. The ulema provided a structure to the revolution, as it staged protests exactly forty days after protesters had been killed.
This began on 7 th January , followed by more protests on 18 th February, 29 th March, 10 th May and so on, until such protests garnered sufficient momentum to warrant sustained action. These actions followed a particular structure as forty days was the traditional duration of mourning after a funeral Kurzman, The revolution was escalated further to commemorate Ashura, a day devoted to the martyr Husayn Ali Hussain, Facing such opposition, the Shah left Iran a month later, in January Khomeini returned to Iran soon after, at the beginning of February.
It is clear from the chronology of the revolution that the ulema gave disorganised protests a structure, ensuring that revolutionary fervour did not fade away but was instead concentrated on certain days of the Islamic calendar.
Such symbols constitute the Karbala paradigm, which we will now turn our attention towards. The Karbala paradigm refers to a range of symbols and rituals related to the martyrdom of Husayn Ali — the third Imam — at the Battle of Karbala. Hence, the mourning of protesters during was not simply an occasion to grieve, but an occasion to revolt.
This combination of an overarching theme of rebellion with a calendar based around historical examples of resistance allowed the ulema to communicate to the Iranian population a revolutionary message in religious language.
Thus, the employment of the Karbala paradigm to unify a mass movement and depose the Shah provides strong evidence for labelling the revolution as Islamic, even though its initial demands were political and economic rather than religious. This essay has demonstrated that the Iranian revolution of can be appropriately labelled as Islamic. Although the demands and unrest that initiated the revolution were political and economic, the Iranian ulema used its position of influence to co-opt the revolution and translate political and economic demands into religious symbolism.
The eventual leadership of the revolution was Islamic, due to the institutional power of the ulema and the repression that other organisations had faced. The example of Ali Shariati shows both why the left failed and how the left could have succeeded if it had not been harshly repressed. With the loss of Shariati and the failure of the left, the Iranian ulema represented the only available option for a population which desired revolutionary change.
Abedi, M. Iranian Studies. Volume 19, No. Abrahamian, E. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Volume 10, Issue 1. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N. Ahmineh, M. Volume 6, No. Amjad, M. Journal of Church and State.
Volume 31, Issue 1. Ansari, A. Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 37, No. Axworthy, M. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Berberoglu, B. Humanity and Society.
This led to political paralysis and the unravelling of a government machinery overly dependent on decisions from the top.
Even so, until the summer of few people took the demonstrations seriously; still fewer considered them a threat to the regime. Indeed, in contrast to other Arab states of a similar size and population, Iran was generously endowed with resources and a growing economy that, for all its flaws, held great promise for the future.
By autumn, though, it was clear that the shah was losing control of the situation, not least because he appeared unwilling to take any decisions. This event appears to have been a psychological turning point for the shah who, for all his dictatorial pretensions, found himself ill-suited for that role.
At this point he appeared to be genuinely bewildered by the dawning realisation that large sections of the population might not hold him in strong affection, and became gripped by paralysis. Contingency plans were made at alarming speed by people in Iran and farther afield.
It was an enforced absence that effectively rendered useless the final pillar of the regime — the army. And by February, Khomeini had returned to the country, to a rapturous reception.
This twofold turn of events provoked widespread disbelief. The shock spread to the triumphant revolutionaries, who could not believe the speed of the transformation and, arguably, the relatively low cost of that victory. The real reckoning occurred only after his departure, when the revolution turned on itself.
The Iranian revolutionary Ebrahim Yazdi liked to comment that the real leader of the Islamic Revolution was, in fact, the shah, because only he was able to unite the disparate groups into a single opposition. Once he had departed the scene, that focus was removed — with devastating results.
A third group, the secular nationalists, found themselves squeezed out in the bloody struggle that was to follow.
Two fractures in international relations — one self-inflicted, the other imposed — also served to shore up a tenuous stability. The justification given was that the Americans, having admitted the ailing shah into the United States for cancer treatment, were intent on repeating the coup that had toppled the nationalist prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.
The occupation of the embassy was intended to be a temporary protest. Instead, it became a protracted day exercise in hostage-taking that transformed an already fraught relationship into one of growing enmity.
The eight-year war with Iraq and the growing antipathy with the United States had a profound effect on the direction of the revolution and the Islamic Republic it spawned. They created an acute sense of ongoing crisis that the political settlement, marred by inconsistencies and contradictions, did little to assuage.
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